own rights. In fact, the aftereffects are actually same serious as social emergencies in reality, especially in so me soft-power fields, such as images, brands, reputations, credits, and so on. At present, most theoretical literatures have focused on the information management in the social emergencies in reality. For examp le, Koehler etc. discussed the environmental and healthy risks information gap between the information supply and demand of the parties concerned [3] . Liu discussed the information effect on unexpected incidents involving mass participation [4] . Camb raia et al. proposed guidelines for identifying, analyzing and disseminating information on near misses in construction sites [5] . Liu et al. proposed an Internet emergency search method based on network information traffic [6] . Fanti et al. investigated the desensitizat ion to media vio lence over a short period of time [7] . In general, Internet emergency is a controversial topic among the media, scholars, netizens and governments, despite that some countries have issued tentative provisions about Internet information supervision and control. Recently, a Foreign Policy Magazine article argued that Wikileaks and social med ia played important roles in the events of the Tunisian Jasmine Revolution, where the protests were aided by social networking tools like Twitter, LiveJournal, and Facebook [8, 9] . Along with high-speed progress of information construction in some newly industrializing countries, Internet emergency requires more attention.
The netizen behaviors are characterized by observation, imitation and learning, wh ich accords with the hypothesis of bounded rationality in evolutionary game. In this paper, we propose several new evolutionary game concepts about Internet emergency, and use these concepts to explain the public opinion evolutionary mechanism and information supervision.
Evolutionary Game Model of Internet Emergency

Factor game with individual acceptant degree
It is not unusual that some social hot topics turn out to be the inducement of Internet emergencies. A netizen may co mment on a particular social event according to his/her own value judgment, the available informat ion, the attitudes of other netizens, etc. Because of the anonymous, costless and off-site indirect d iffusing characteristics of Internet information, most of the netizens obtain cognition through secondhand information from other netizens.
In the tradit ional evolutionary game theory, a normal form stage game is defined by the fitness function f(x i ,
, where x i S is the (possibly mixed) strategy chosen by a specific player i, and x i -1 S is the current state. Obviously, the concept of fitness derived fro m population biology is not suitable to explain social and economic phenomena. Even if the netizens payoffs in the Internet virtual world may be represented by some kind of v irtual money in an Internet game or the click-through rates in a foru m, the goals of most netizens concerned about an Internet emergency are not to obtain virtual money or to increase the click-through rate. Usually, most of netizens are not loyal to a particu lar foru m. That is to say, they post their opinions or they go through the opinions of others when they randomly visit some websites .
In this paper, we propose a concept of individual acceptance degree in the case of an Internet emergency to replace the existing concept of payoff . Usually, the netizens attitudes towards a specific social hot topic can be divided into Support (S) , Neutral (N) , or Denial (D) . Thus the strategy set can be represented by a triplet I={S, N, D}. We define the concept of individual acceptance degree of a netizen as d(x i , x i -1 ) [-1, 1] for some attitude i, where the value -1 indicates that the netizen entirely rejects attitude i; the value 1 indicates full acceptance of attitude i; and the value 0 reflects the situation that the netizen is neutral with respect to attitude i. Because the Internet behavior has the stronger herd mentality and effect of hint, the netizen would take the entire accept the attitude, d(x i , x i -1 )=1, only if the opponent s attitude is consistent with himself. Otherwise, because of the difference between the others and his/her own attitudes, the netizen tend to disbelieve his/her own former judg ment under the external consensus pressure. Consequently the netizen may consider partial acceptance, which means -1 < d(x i , x i -1 ) < 1. Kahneman d iscussed Prospect Theory to explain this phenomenon [10] . Because the replies on Internet are anonymous, netizens are taken as a monomo rphic group. So the factor game of Internet emergency can be seen in Table 1 , where 0 < a < 1, and 0 < b < 1.
T able 1. Internet emergency 3×3 factor game with the monomorphic netizen group
The proportional distributions of netizens decentralized behaviors at time t are defined as S (t), N (t), D (t). Obviously, the factor game has two pure Nash Equilibriu ms and one mixed Nash Equilibriu m S * = (s S * , s N * , s D * ). We consider the random sampling strategy R in the pure strategy space I, R = (1/ 3, 1/3, 1/ 3), where a netizen stochastically chooses the attitude of Support , Neutral or Denial with the probability 1/3. So the utility of mixed strategy R is (R) = 2/ 9 > (s N ). Therefore the attitude of Neutral is the strict ly do minated strategy by the random sampling strategy R, N (t) 0, which means that the mixed strategy S * =(s S * , s N * , s D * ) is an unstable Nash Equilibrium. We can get
Evolutionary equation concerning information supervision
In any social economic system, the essence of behavior evolution is that (due to imitat ion and learn ing or resource redistribution or entry and exit) fitter strategies increase relative to less fit strategies in every population. Generally, the evolutionary dynamics can be divided into four types: the proportional, ran k-order, signs, and positively dynamics correlated with relative payoff. The proportional dynamics is the most popular one in the literature wh ich is also named as Replicator Dynamics. Each player is a representation of some special monomorphic bio logical population, wh ich adopts a pure strategy s i within a period of time t. The proportional growth rate of this strategy d i (t)/dt is a strictly monotonically increasing function in terms of the difference between its payoff (s i ) and the group average payoff. When Replicator Dynamics model is used to explain social and economic phenomena, there are obvious differences among various strategies in the social learning obstacles. Taking the strategic observability into consideration, Sethi proposed a general replicator dynamic model as follows [11] i i
where i is the social learning obstacle of the strategy i, and B i (s) = {j I | j (s) > i (s)} is the strategy set that the utility is higher than the strategy i. For the public op inions in Internet emergency, several important factors will have effects on the st rategic observability, such as the background of the social event, the media reports, the informat ion supervision, etc. When the general replicator dynamic Eq. (2) is applied to the public opinions, we can obtain a specific expression based on the payoff matrix (see Table 1 ), wh ich simplifies into the infectious diseases diffusion model as follow
where i is the Internet information supervision degree for the netizen s attitude i. Eq. (3) reflects the diffusing phase of Internet emergency, and Eq. (4) reflects the convergent phase. Conclusion 1. Considering the information supervision for public opinion in Internet emergency, the general replicator dynamic equation of public opinion simplifies into the infectious diseases diffusion model with the information supervision degree i for the netizen s strategy i.
Finite individual players (changing population size)
Most of the theoretical literatures assume that evolutionary game models include infinite individual players. Even if the actual population size could be growing or declin ing over time , it does not have any effect on the state space specification. This assumption is however questionable. The population size of netizens in Internet emergency is changing obviously at different evolutionary phases. Usually, it grows in the d iffusion phase, and then declines in the convergent phase. When analyzing the evolutionary mechanism of public opin ions in Internet emergency, we should take the changing netizens population size into account since this could affect the distribution of state space. If the population size is large enough, the dynamic evolutionary course can be specified by ordinary differential equations or difference equations in a continuous state space. We can ignore the random fluctuations and differing perceptions of the current state in the evolutionary game model.
Define the total number of netizens at t ime t as N(t ), and the nu mber o f netizens with Support (S) attitude as N S (t). Further define the proportion of S as S (t) = N S (t)/N(t). Then the general replicator dynamics model described by Eqs. (3) and (4) of the public opinions can be written as the frequency distribution equations:
Suppose the original nu mber of netizens in the outbreak period t = 0 is N(0). When the Internet emergency is spreading, the number of netizens gradually increases until it reaches the maximu m N(t T ) max at the turning point t = t T , where the netizens utility of Support strategy is equal to that of the Denial strategy. After passing the event turning point t T , the number of netizens decreases, and the situation is slowly returning calm. We suppose that the changing number of netizens follows the law of normal distribution about time t as follow
The evolutionary course of public opin ion in Internet emergency is similar to the classical d iseases diffusion SIS/SIR model. A lthough some existing literatures have applied SIS/SIR model to discuss the ru mor diffusing course in the special social network structure [12] , they did not give the evolutionary mechanism of ru mor diffusion. In this paper, firstly, we build an evolutionary game model to exp lain the diffusing mechanis m of public opinion. Secondly, we take the frequency distribution function to reflect the evolutionary course of public opinion with changing population size. Because the evolution dynamics is not only dependent on the changing behavior of the player himself/herself, but also dependent on the changing behavior of the opponent and the changing external environ ment (for examp le, info rmation supervision and payoff adjustment), it is difficult to give the analytic solutions about Eqs. (3), (4), (5) and (6) . In the Section 3, we take the numerical simu lation with case analysis to discuss the effects of Internet information supervision and control measures for social affairs on the evolutionary course of public opinions.
Numerical Experiments: The October 24, 2009 Self-sacrifice Event
Internet
The 10.24 self-sacrifice event in 2009 reported by various media triggered wide response among the netizens. On one hand, the netizens highly praised the heroic deeds of self-sacrifice; on the other hand, the netizens unanimously condemned the outrageous behavior of those fishing boat owners as breaking the lowest limits of social mo rality and bringing shame to everyone in the country. As the Internet public opinions continued to ferment, the Jing zhou City government started to investigate the truth of this serious event, and released an announcement that the nearby fishing boat owners participated in the rescue, but the salvage ships did nothing. The various netizens comments in two periods can be shown in References [13] and [14] .
For netizens with strong interests in the 10.24 self-sacrifice event , they wou ld post comments on the related BBS or other Internet foru ms to express their own opin ions of support or denial. While, for other netizens with a neutral attitude, they might only take a hasty glimpse and moved on to other topics . Therefore any comments such as Intensely condemn the behavior , Advise cyber manhunt can be taken as a Support attitude, and any comments such as Understand the behavior of , Discontent with local government and other replies including Mourn for victim students , Condemn the salvage ship can be taken as a Denial attitude that prevents the situation fro m spreading. The co mments in the Internet foru ms were classified and further studied to reflect a netizen s indiv idual acceptance degree, which is a = 0.72 and b = 0.28 on October 30, 2009 in the diffusing course. Similarly, we have a = 0.354 and b= 0.646 on November 7, 2009 in the convergent course.
When an Internet emergency continuously escalates, the influence of public opinions in Internet will spread to the real social life with enormous organizational mob ilization and publicity effect. Now, it is urgent for the Internet management authorities to consider effective info rmation supervision measures. On one hand, the real informat ion must be disclosed and strengthened. For example, clarifying the facts, publicizing the relative materials and evidences, building specialized websites, etc., can help to eliminate the learning obstacle, i 1. On the other hand, the false in formation and the demagogical co mments in the Internet foru m need to be shielded or deleted, which would increase the strategy learning disabilities, i 0.
We carry a numerical analysis of the general replicator dynamic Eq. (5) and (6) to study the information supervision by Internet management authorities. In the model, the influencing factors in the evolutionary equations include the informat ion supervision degree i , the initial proportional distribution i (t 0 ), and the netizen s utility d ifference (s i ). The informat ion supervision degree i is an impo rtant control variab le determined by the Internet management authorities, which are set as S = 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, and 0.9, respectively. Let the individual acceptance degrees be a = 0.72 and b = 0.28 in the Eq. (5) in the diffusing course, we can get the lower limit of orig inal p roportion S (t 0 ) = 0.427. According to the diffusing Eq. (5), The left of Fig. 1 displays the influences of information supervision on public opinions in the October 24 self-sacrifice event .
Conclusion 2. When
Internet management authorities strengthen the information supervision of public opinions in the diffusing phase, for example, some extreme or fictitious forum posts are shielded or deleted, S 0, the diffusing speed of Internet emergency becomes slower, obviously.
Extended model considering Internet supervision and control measure
When an Internet emergency breaks out, relevant govern ment department need to imp lement contingency plans promptly in order to win the support of public opinions, for examp le, to start an immediate investigation of the social hot issues, publicize the news in time, adjust the payoffs, etc. Once the above control measures reach the crit ical condition Eq. (5), the evolutionary course of Internet emergency should enter into the convergent phase expressed by Eq. (6) .
According to netizens comments in Reference 13 and 14, let the individual acceptance degrees be a = 0.354 and b = 0.646 in the convergent course in Eq. (5), we can get the crit ical proportion S (t T ) = 0.548 in the turning point. Substitute this into the convergent Eq. (6), we can get the crit ical time t T = 27.07. In our analysis, we only choose informat ion supervision degree S = 0.3 as an examp le to discuss the influence of controlling measures on the evolutionary course (see (b) in Figure2). In the early phase, S (t T ) < 0.548, the evolutionary mechanism of October 24 self-sacrifice event follows the diffusing curve described by Eq. (5). In the later convergent phase, S (t T ) > 0.548, the government authorities take control measures to promote the evolution of events across the turning point effectively and finally enter the convergent course. Obviously, with the information being disclosed and strengthened in the convergent phase, D 1, for examp le, clarify ing the facts, publicizing the relative materials and evidences, building specialized websites, etc., Internet emergency is returning calm more rapidly. In the lower right corner of (b) in Figure 1 , the convergent speed becomes faster with larger D . (5) , the evolutionary course of public opinion in Internet emergency should enter into the convergent phase. In particular, information disclosure in the latter phase can help calm the situation.
Conclusion 2 and 3 show that the informat ion supervision taken by Internet management depart ment may have an important influence on the evolutionary speed of public opinions, but it cannot change the evolutionary tendency. If the relevant government depart ment takes the contingency plans and effective measures to control social events, the evolutionary tendency of public opinion can be transformed fundamentally. Moreover, the sooner government do it, the better it will be. It is noticeable that the above conclusions are based on the hypothesis of fixed population size. If we relax the assumptions, i.e., the changing population size, will the above conclusions still hold? We should discuss this problem through numerical simulation in the following.
Extended model with changing population size
There have been 4152 websites publishing the news Hubei college students save drowning, nearby fishing boats do nothing about them until October 30, 2009 [13] . Correspondingly, there have been only 1402 websites publishing the news Jingzhou City, Hubei Province investigate and restore the students save drowning scene until November 7, 2009 [14] . So the nu mber of netizens can be set as N(0) = 1402, and N(t T ) max = 4152. Insert them into Eq. (7), the of Normal Distribution can be calculated as follow (6) which intersect each other at the critical point N S (t T ) = 769, we can get the practical value of informat ion supervision degree S = 0.000065, and the critical time t T = 26.96, wh ich is the mean value of the Normal Distribution in Eq. (7) . So we get the frequency distribution of the number of netizens holding Support attitude under the fixed population size N = 1402 (the left panel in Figure 2 ), and the changing population size that fo llo ws Normal Distribution Eq. (7), which is represented by the dotted line (the right panel in Figure 2 ). 
Conclusions
Internet information supervision is a controversial topic in the world. This paper studies the evolutionary mechanis m and informat ion supervision of public opinions in Internet emergency, and the following conclusions can be drawn:
When Internet manager strengthen the information supervision of public opinions, e.t., shield ing some exaggerated or fictitious forum postings, the diffusing speed of Internet emergency becomes slow.
If the control measures taken by relevant government departments for social hot events reach the critical condition, the evolutionary course of public opinion in Internet emergency should enter into the convergent phase. In particular, information disclosure in the latter phase can help calm the situation. Considering the changing netizen population size, the small delay effect happens both in the diffusing phase and convergent phase because of the smaller peak point at the lower turn point. Recently, the Internet emergency and Internet violence frequently appear in the virtual world. China is in the Jungle Era of social media, wh ich (or Internet marketer) [15] . The paper does not distinguish real netizens fro m the water army . Moreover, the parameters used in the paper are main ly derived fro m the case of October 24 self-sacrifice event y to comp ile an Internet emergency database consisting of more cases. The conclusions reported in this paper are just based on preliminary works. Further studies are required to improve theoretical model and numeral simulations.
